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                           Prefatory Remarks 
     In 1952, Prof. Eberhardt Schmidt concluded his speech by saying: "Positivism 
  died. Positivism ought to live (Der Positivismus i tot, es lebe der Positivismus)."11 
  This is a kind of question puzzling us. This is a kind of question, as well, to provoke 
  us to consider the proper scope of legal positivism, in other words, what the died positi-
  vism is, and what the positivism worth to live is. 
      However, it is evident hat we tend to use andthink of the word legal positivism 
  in accordance with an ordinary connotation which is usually based on a popular impres-
  sion. A typical example of this popular impression will be found in an idea according 
  to which the only task of lawyers and law scholars i  to deal with and to apply positive 
  law in an empirical way. I think such a popular impression is not wrong, but it is still 
      fi This is a summary ofmy Japanese paper published under the same title in "The Japan 
  Annual Philosophy of Law, 1963. The Japan Association f Legal Philosophy had a conference 
  to reconsider l gal positivism inlast spring (1962). This is the reason why the special issue of 
  The Japan Annual, 1963, is published with the heading of "Legal Positivism Reconsidered". 
  As to the content of my paper, itconstitutes a part of my main study-"Validity of and Fidelity 
   to Law in the Changing Mass Society". My papers cited below, too, have been written for the 
   same reason. 
      * Professor of General Juriprudence, Osaka University.
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  vague in its content. The more vague in its content, the more it is open to implications, 
  sometimes, even to extreme interpretations. One of them is a position to identify legal 
  positivism with fetishism of statutory laws enacted by state which would again cause a 
 popular criticism to itself. 
     But it must be newly wondered why legal positivism should be identified with 
  such a legal feticism. Despite of the popular criticism, I think rather the scope of 
 legal positivism is wider and more extensive, than that criticism expected. Moreover, 
 since discussion on legal positivism at present plays a decisive role on the problem how 
 to make judicial decision and to advance legal study, it seems to be highly urgent for 
 us to reconsider such a popular criticism before unconditionally accepting them. In 
 this paper, I am aiming at to clarify the significance and functions of legal positivism 
 by reference to its four sources. What is legal positivism worth to live will, finally, 
 depends on the judgments of each scholars participating in this discussion.In this 
 respect, however, I would like to show some possible way to reconsider and to judge 
 this question puzzling us. In dealing with this theme, I shall refer to natural law theory, 
 so far as it is necessay to make clear relation between legal postivism and it. 
          It is intersting to see natural aw theory being followed by the popular 
      critcism which imagines it as the extreme opponent to legal positivism. I shall 
       refer here only that same question rises about the scope and extension of this 
      theory as well as legal positivism. 
          As to the problem of legal positivism we should remember the recent 
       event hat an international conference on this theme was held at Belaggiolocated 
       near Lake Como, Italy, under the aid of Lockfeller foundation, Sept. 1960 and 
       that many famous representatives like Prof. N. Bobbio, A.P. d'Entreves, H.L.A. 
       Hart, Alf Ross, G. Gavazzi joined the discussion there approximatelyduring 
       two weeks. Whenever I refers to this suggestive discussion below, I usually 
       cite it from the review done by Prof. R. A. Falk and S. I. Schuman. 
                  I. Four Sources of Legal') Positivism 
               The First Source Positive Law Position 
     What make legal positivists their main object of study? According to general 
 impression, it is positive law (positives Recht). Legal positivism in this sense ispositive 
 law position. As to the word positive law, however, there are so different implications 
 that they show us a striking contrast. For in common law countries, judical precedents
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are generally accepted tobe one of the main sources of positive law besides statutes, 
while the latter, particularly, statutes enacted by state has been often considered to be 
a most decisive element for characterization of positive law in civil law countries. In-
deed, A. Merkel who acted as pioneer of legal positivism in the latter half of the 19th 
century Germany mentioned to positive law by reference tothe civil law point of view. 
"As state has been developed, law making process based by state, too, is getting to be 
in action. In corresponding to this process, there develops the law which, according 
to the content of its idea, owes the validity to the will dominant in state, therefore, to
the enactment byhuman action, so far as divine nature is not attributed toit. In other 
words, there develops the `positive' law which is accepted assuch".2) 
   Another type of illustration seems to be afforded by J. C. Gray in U.S.A. Em-
phasizing the significance of judicial precedents and the role of judges (judicial court) 
in making these precedents, heshowed the feature of positive law position from the 
common law point of view. "The Law of the State or of any organized body of men 
is composed of the rules which the courts, that is, the judicial organs of that body, lay 
down for the determination of legal rights and duties... Judicial precedents have been 
the chief material for building up the Common Law, but this has been far otherwise 
in the systems of the Continent of Europe".3) 
         The word positive law, so faras we have xamined above, has at least wo 
     different types of implications: the law made by human action in an empirical 
     way (see the second source section) on the one hand and standard forjudicial 
     court o apply as well as to make laws in order to decide cases on the other hand. 
     Besides, I would like to add a few words on the positive law position of Gray. 
     For Gray himself did not use the word positive law in his famous lectures,"The 
     Nature and Sources of The Law". But, since he aimed in these lecturesatto 
     analyze and reconsider the Austinian theory of law and yet he repeatedly cited
     the word positive law used by Austin, he is naturally supposed to be acquainted 
     with it. Moreover we have a very good reason for believing this presumption. 
     It is the fact that he was deeply interested in the criticism of natural law, in 
     other words, meta-positive law (nicht positives Recht), particularly achieved 
     by Karl Berbohm, and he frequently cited it in an appreciation to Bergbohm's 
     effort. Then, why didn't he explicitly use the word positive law? The pos-
     sible reason is that as he made an effort to separate the Law and the Sources of 
     Law, he didn't refer the word positive law, but he made the Law his subjectof
     lectures. Now the Law, according to Gray, "is the whole system of rules ap-
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     plied by the courts", while "Law which the courts do not follow" is "nicht 
     positivisches Recht" or "the Law of Nature". On these grounds, I feel theLaw 
     is equivalent to positive law. 
   Turning now to positive law position, we shall pay attention to two different 
types of aspects underlying two different ypes of it said above. On the one hand, 
the very nature of decision of state power (including judicial decision-though this 
may not be general aspect applicable to even civil law system) has been considered to 
be a decisive lement in making positive law. Thomas Hobbes is naturally the person 
who placed stress with great boldness on this aspect of the matter in the modern intel-
lectual history. John Austin who defined the law to be command of sovereign, as we 
know, followed, too, to this aspect. To use his words, Every "positive law, or every 
law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of 
persons, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein that 
person or body is sovereign or supreme. Or (changing the expression) it is set by a 
monarch, or sovereign umber, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its 
author."4) 
   On the other hand, there is another aspect of the matter to consider ule or norm 
to be basis of positive law. The most striking illustration of this is afforded by the 
old saying that what governs in the modern state, is not a man or men, but rule or norm. 
H. Krabbe has been referred to as aa typical representative who emphasized this aspect 
of the matter. In a sense, Gray, too, seems to be close to this aspect so far as he point-
ed out as follows: The Law is "the whole system of rules applied by the courts. The 
resemblance of the terms suggests the inference that the body of rules applied by the 
courts is composed wholly of the commands of the State; but to erect his suggsetion 
into a demonstration, and say: - The system administered by the courts is `the Law,' 
`the Law' consists of nothing but an aggregate of single laws
, and all single laws are 
commands of the State - is not justifiable."5) 
   We may call each of theseaspects decisionism or might theory, and normativism 
or rule theory. The former sees the decisive lement for enactment and validity of 
positive law in the decision of state power or naked might (power), while the latter 
asserts emphatically rule or norm forming the last basis of positive law. Therefore, 
whenever we use the word Hobbesean positivism of law, it may be used in the context 
of decisionistic legal positivism. The term legal postitivism of conceptual jurisprudence 
(Begriffsjurisprudenz) in Continental Europe, on the contrary, carries usually the 
implication of normativistic legal positivism.
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   To speak figuratively, the difference between decisionism and normativismwill 
be found in the way how to view the fundamental structure of positive legal order. 
For instance, what is the ground of validity of laws or statuory enactments? It is a 
constitution or constitutional law. What is the basis of validity of constitution? Ac-
cording to Prof. Hans Kelsen, it comes to be basic norm. Then, what is the last 
basis of validity of basic. norm? Here is a trap we often are caught in. If we are 
on the hypothetical ssumption that basic norm has apriori validity, the ultimate 
basis of its validity comes to be found in norm or rule. If we are, on the contrary, 
not satisfied with such an assertion, but we assert hat what actually supports basic 
norm is might, power or any sociological determinants similar to these, this assertion 
may well be understood in the context of determinism or might theory. Prof. Kelsen, 
so far as his way of thinking before his visit to U.S.A. is concerned, seems to show 
an interesting dualism, so to speak, in his basic norm theory, that, while accepting 
fundamentally normativism, his way of thinking is still open to decisionism by ack-
nowledging a moment "transformation f might o law" (Transformation der Macht 
zum Recht)6) as to the content of basic norm. 
   The difference between the aspectsof this sort could be also, I believe, found in 
the common law point of view to regard judicial precedents orcase law as a main source 
of positive law. Aside from the question on fundamental structure of positive legal 
order said above, let us cite one example in regard to the problem how to understand 
character of judicial decision in a chain of judicial precedents. As we know, there 
are two dominant heories. The one is the "declaration" theory. According to it, 
judicial precedents are nothing but confirmations or declarations of a pre-existing law, 
in other words, only "evidence"" (Blackstone). So far as this pre-existing law or judicial 
precedent is concerned, however, it retroactively presupposes another judicial precedent 
pre-existing before it. If we trace back to origin of judicial precedents by examining 
each of their basis step by step, we come to reach a hypothetical assumption that such 
a precedent or pre-existing law should having had existed.8) Viewed in this light, 
the logic of judicial precedents i  normativistic, asfar as it ultimately presupposes rule 
or norm pre-existing. The other is the "making" theory which forms a striking cont-
rast with the "declaration" theory. The term judge-made-law which was used first by 
J. Bentham and yet becomes the customary term for characterizating of the common 
law at present, affords a best illustration of the fact that case law is law which judge 
makes through the means of judicial decision. For the reason above, this theory im-
plies a decisionistic implication.
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   But, finding links of connection between the fact that only after law is decided 
to make and enacted by people who are in power, the law decided in this way, that is, 
rule or norm comes to be in valid, and the fact that even if people are actually in power 
to decide everything, they can not still disregard meaning of rule or norm in regrad 
to their decision making, it is quite obvious that normativism has not been diametrically 
opposed to decisionism at least in the course of their historical development. What 
is dominant factors in promoting the historical course in development, is the formation 
of modern civil state (supported by capitalistic ivil society) on the one hand and the 
formation of the modern law and rule of law on the other hand. First of all, postulate 
and effect of centralization of political powers into the sovereign state raises an idea 
that sovereign power decides everything. It is T. Hobbes who drew in an impressive 
way the Leviathan with its sovereign supremacy from such a historical background. 
Despite of this fact, he assigned to rules of prudence the role to control, though impli-
citly, an excercise of sovereign power. Rules of prudence are, as a matter of course, 
natural law. If so, it is possible to well conceive of idea of Hobbes in such a way that 
normativism ofnatural law is given by him the role to control over tyranny of decision-
ism even though it plays the role merely in an implicit way. 
        It is certainly iteresting to imagine what kind of feeling Hobbes would have 
     had on the contemporary totalitarianism, if he would have lived in that period. 
     An idea given by Prof. C.J. Friedrich seems to be deserve attention in order to 
     clarify the context mentioned above. "The policy of a Hitler or a Mussolini 
     would have been condemned outright by Hobbes, for the simple reasonthat these 
     totalitarian dictators neglected in a senseless fashion the prudential rules,that 
      is, the ` laws of human nature'."9) 
   What happened, then, in the process of modernization of legal thought from 
Hobbes to present? To speak generally, its modernization reminds us of the great 
change from normativism ofnatural law to normativism ofpositive law which was made 
still by retaining decisionism to some extent. In this connection, the parliamentary 
sovereignity was, so to speak, a milestone in establishing the idea: government by law, 
not by men, in a modern sense. On the other hand, as state in its survival is getting in 
jeopardy, there again appeared and appears decisionistic positivism. As to the fate 
of this decisionism under the Nazi regime, we shall refer to it later. Before, let us pay 
attention to the very familiar, but so important source of legal positivism which espe-
cially appeared in 19th century. It is empiricism.
                  The Second Source - Empiricism 
   One of the most remarkable r sults of the new method which science, particularly 
natural science has developed isthe fact it awakes the public to a sense of empiricism 
as a part of modern way of thinking. In modern times, when the capitalistic production 
has been getting to be dominant form in the civil society, accordingly industrial enter-
prises on a large scale have been developed-Remember the Industrial Revolution period! 
- ,technological problems how to develop roduction, have created considerable dis-
cussion which again requires participants to reconsider whether their approach adapts 
to these problems. Here develops methodology of natural-science. This methodology 
as we know, constitutes of the positivistic operation (or casuistic investigation) of hy-
pothesis and varification, theory and experiment. On the other hand, it is deemed an 
essential feature of the methodology that it eliminates from its frame of investigation 
what is beyond the demension of human action and varification, that is, metaphysical 
way of thinking. We may call here such a methodology followed by those features 
empiricism. If so, it is no wonder that one should have applied it from the investigation 
of natural phenomena to social phenomena or social relations. "Cours de philosophic 
positive" (A. Comte) presents a good example for this transformation. For several 
features immanent in the empirical methodology is equally found in the field of social 
science as welll as of natural science so that they make possible modern way of thinking 
to develop. What shows, more or less, this trend in the field of legal thinking is legal 
positivism, because legal positivism actually deals with positive law made (enacdted) 
by human action in an empirical way and yet it is diametrically opposed to metaphysical 
way of thinking of law. 
   According to the empiricism of legal positivism, it is necessary at first to pay at-
tention to sociological or psychological pproach to law. The first type of the empiri-
cism, therefore, is sociological or psychological positivism of law. We have enough 
founders for this type of legal positivism - so far as criminal phenomena is concerned, 
E. Ferri who emphasized to investigate social causes of the phenomena, R. Garofalo 
who developed its socio-psychological study, F. von List who developed positive scienti-
fic study of the criminal phenomena by observing it from social side as well as individual 
side, and so far as relatively recent rends are concerned, E. Ehrlich who made an at-
tempt to clarify the social foundation of law by introducing the concept of living law 
immanent in social groups into the scope of sociology of law, M. Weber who, viewing
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"rationalization" as one of the peculiar phenomena to occidental Europe, made an ex-
haustive study to analiyze modern law embodied with its predictable orrational function 
in an adequate connection to modern capitalistic society, the Sociological Jurisprudence 
of U.S.A. which lays special emphasis on the element of social interest and social control 
through law in the study of law, Realist group who are very much interested in the be-
havioristic approach to law. These so many founders or representatives, a  a matter 
of course, has taken and take so various directions like sociology of law, pragmatism, 
legal realism, such and such. Frankly speaking, however, to maintain a positive (posi-
tivistic) attitude is a minimal condition in order to have a sufficient knowledge of law, 
and yet for this purpose it is necessary to analze the law in the social context where it 
functions and under the psychological condition which it appeals to. This is, so to 
speak, a common denominator which establishes a link connecting between so different 
trends. 
   Besides, there is the second type of empiricism of legal positivism. This is logical 
or analytical positivism of law. As far as it makes an empirical treatment of positive 
law main subject, it is very similar to the sociological or psychological positivism of 
law. How to find a guaranty for an empirical treatment of positive law, that is, whether 
should we find it in the sociological or psychological pprach, or in the logical or analyti-
cal investigation, however, seems to raise a variation in the scope of legal positivism as 
empiricism so that it offers a chance for two types of the empiricism to deviate from each 
other. This may be much more understandable if we refer to Prof. W. Friedmann's 
idea that modern empirical approach is divided into three main classes, empiricism, 
pragmatism and logical positivism.1o) 
   When we regard thematter in this light, we see obviously that logical or analytical 
positivsim is what often with legal positivism in general has been identified. It is re-
presented by the conceptual jurisprudence in Continent, and Austinian school of ana-
lytical positivism in England. If we may summerlize main task of analitical positivism 
of law as "an analysis of legal terms, and an inquiry into the logical interrelations of legal 
propositins",l") we may call logical positivism of law such a way of legal thinking which 
begins by analyzing and classifying legal concepts and propositions, and leads to a hypot-
hetical assertion of a logical completeness of legal system. Carrying it to the furthest 
extreme, the way of legal thinking of this sort seems to be natural to be named legal 
positivism of conceptual jurisprudence, or legal fetishism, so far as it performs "cal-
culation with concepts" (Berechnung mit Begriffen - R. von Jhering) and it believes 
in the dogma of legal system without contradictions and gaps. That is why logical or
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analytical positivism of law is easily connected with the normativism of positive law 
position said above. 
         Letus take a few examples to serve as an illustration fthe legal thinking lay-
     ing a special emphasis on logic and systmeatic knowledge in law. "Systematic 
     knowledge is only a complete one as to the law, especially it is complete in a ex-
     ternal side. For the systematic knowledge ives merely the guaranty that it subsume 
     certainly all parts of law.. .What is complete in an internal' side, too,is only 
     systematic knowledge. For, since the law itself constitutes a ystem, only such 
     people who see the law in a system come to ascertain the nature of law. More-
     over, to obtain asystematic knowledge is possible for people who have mastered 
     the interrelations of legal propositions. In other words, people whobegin by 
     studying the similar interrelations of legal propositions, and thus, come to ac-
     knowledge in both ways of going up and going down the fact that each concepts 
     come from the intermedia which ave participated in to construct theseconcepts." 
     Thus said G. F. Puchta in the term of "Genealogy of Concepts".12) Following 
     Puchta nd Historical School of Law, there apprared representatives of legal 
     positivism, orconceptual jurisprudence in a extreme case in 19th centuryGer-
     many like K. Bergbohm, P. Laband, B. Windscheid etc. Jhering himself shows 
     us an interesting personal history in this streem, because he criticized therole 
     and significance of the conceptual jurisprudence, after he started in life asa 
     scholar of this trend of jurisprudence. 
         At last, let us cite F. Neumann's idea in order to know relations between 
     logical or analytical positivism of law, normativism and interpretation f law. 
     "The legal system of liberalism, therefore, was regarded as a closed system with-
     out gaps. All the judge had to do was to apply it. The juridical thinking of 
     this epoch was called positivism or normativism, and the interpretationof the
     laws by the judge was called the dogmatic interpretation (in Germany) orexegeti-
     cal interpretation (i  France). Bentham, too, in order to achieve complete in-
     telligibility and clarity in the legal system, recommended thecodificationf
     English law".13) 
   As to theorigin of the logical or formalistic positivism of law developed in
Germany, as we know, ther are several suggestions. Some one has suggested that he 
scholastic theology in the middle age (hence, the glossarists-too) beared some resemb-
lance to legal positivism of this sort, since it believed in its capability oput completely 
an interpretation any theological problems by reference to a system which God
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stands at the top of.14) The other has suggested that conceptual jurisprudence of legal 
positivism, so far as it made the law monopolized by state main subject, is similar to 
"the legal thought viewing as absolute the state law" (E. Ehrlich).15) 
   But, logical or analytical positivism of law in modern times, including- English 
type of it, seems naturally to have developed under several conditions, especially the 
development of modern capitalistic society on the one side and its demand on the law 
as minimal means for social control, in other words, the law embodied with its predict-
able or rational function on the other side. Seed in this light, it has a character ofempiri-
cism as well as sociological or psychological positivism of law. I am, in this respect, 
for the idea which Prof. E. Bodenheimer sets forth. "Legal positivism has manifested 
itself most conspicuiusly in a jurisprudence of an analytical type, here designated as 
analytical positivism... Legal postivism, however, may also take on a sociological form. 
Sociological positivism undertakes to investigate and describe the various ocial forces 
which excercise an influence upon the making of positive law. It is concerned with 
analyzing not the legal rules produced by the state, but the sociological factors respon-
sible for their enactment. It shares with analytical positivism a purely empirical atti-
tude toward the law and a disinclination to search for and postulate ultimate values in 
the legal order".16) 
                       The Third Source -
         Position Placing a Special Emphasis on Law as It Is 
   To separate law as it is from law as it ought o be is thought at present as a main task 
of legal positivism. The third source, therefore, is position placing aspecial emphasis 
on law as it is. This position aims at to eliminate from the framework of (investigation 
of) law law as it ought to be, that is, law which can not be acknowledged in an empirical 
way, including natural law as well as empiricism of legal positivism tends to be diametri-
cally opposed tometaphysical w y of legal thinking. As I have used the word including 
natural law, however, natural law is merely a part of law as it ought to be. Since morality, 
religion, etc, too, have insisted "it should be so, it ought to be so", these are naturally 
included in the category law as it ought o be. Such is also the case with demands of 
politics-policy. One may surely wonder whether the demands of politics-policy are 
included in that category, but we shall consider them to be included in law as it ought 
to be, as far as they are means reflecting always certain political ends. Viewing in 
this light, legal positivism, after dealing with political demands, insistence on ought to
                                                       11
be, still more, natural law, as constituting the content of law as it ought to be, seems to 
separate and eliminate hem altogether from the framework of law as it is. Here is 
a position placing aspecial emphasis onlaw as it is, or positivism oflaw as it is. 
   At first we shall distinguish between two sides, positive and negativeside as to 
the positivism oflaw as it is. A good illustration ofthe positive side will be found in 
the Kelsen's idea. According to Kelsen, pure theory of law is theory of positive law 
without impurities, hence, theory of pure law. In my opinion, it is positivism oflaw 
as it is. This theory made an effort o escape from the intervention f impurities, 
especially totalitarian politics to investigation of law, and it was indeed so, as far as its 
subjective intention is concerned. To speak in a paradoxical way, such a purism of 
law as it is was actually followed by somewhat liberal attitude, that is, impurities. 
The more liberal attitude was immanent in his theory, however, the more it switched 
the purism to sound course, and assined it a role to resist - even though this might be 
a trivial effort -against the tyranny of totalitarianism.") Viewed in this light, it is 
not so hard to find positive side in the positivism oflaw as it is. 
   But the positivism of law as it is in an ordinary sense tends to be understood in 
its negative side. What does it mean is the position which easily accepts any laws only 
if they are given by state, without reference to value standard ofright and wrong or law 
as it ought o be. It is a kind of opportunism opposed to Kelsen's intention. The 
tragedic llustration of this negative side is afforded by legal positivism during Nazi 
period. The legal positivism here has been condemned byreference tothe grounds 
that under the shield of slogan "law is law," "rule is rule", lawyers and law scholars 
accepted and applied Nazi laws so that hey served to maitain Nazi regime. Late Prof. 
G. Radbruch criticized it by saying as follows: "do not believe that we can answer the 
ultimate problems of law and master any most difficult problems of law merely by re-
ference to values like objectivity (Sachlichkeit) and legality - How worse it is if justice 
is concerned with to maintain secondary values like legality and objectivity under the 
influence of legal positivism which had forgotten the highest one of all legal proposi-
tions that man should obey God, rather than people."18) 
   Unbelief in legal positivism atpresent, too, seems nearly to come from the negative 
side (judgement) of this matter. Admitting it to be relatively right, we shall take regard 
also of two entirely different types of the positivism. One is decisionistic positivism 
of law as it is. What does the term decisionism eans during the Nazi period? It 
is to observe decisions made by Leader as law. Certainly, "Hitler did not come to power 
by a violent revolution. He was Chancellor before he became the Leader. The ex-
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ploitation f legal forms started cautiously and became bolder as power was consolidated" 
(Prof. Lon L. Fuller).19) As a matter of fact here were so odious secret enactments 
and measures or directions that they had really afunction toinjure alarge scale of people. 
Why did many lawyers and law scholars accept them? One can find here opportun-
ism or decisionism which does not pay any attention even to objectivity and legality, 
still more value standards. If this is one of the extremes, wecan not forget the other 
extreme, that is, consciencious lawyers and law scholars acted against this dark streem. 
They made an effort to maintain the independnce of judges by eliminating the poli-
tical interference to interpretation and application f law. Their attitude shows 
clearly the light side, therefore, the positive side of positivism of law as it is, even though 
it had only a trivial meaning in reality. In pointing out both sides, the negative and 
positive side, late Prof. Radbruch is still great scholar, although e has been often 
misunderstood asa passionate critic of legal positivism. "Despite of the fact that the 
highest judicial authorities has been deeply fallen, even in such dark years flame of 
justice has never completely overcome in our judicial practice. The Nuremberg 
decision, too, has recognized this fact. It devides judges in the Nazi period into two 
categories. On the one hand, there were judges `who with enthusiasm realized the 
will of the Party in such a strict way that they encoutered no difficulties and inter-
ferences caused by Party officials'. On the other hand, however, still there were judges 
who dared to maintain the ideal of the independence of judges, and decided cases with 
certain objectivity and self-restraint attitude. Their decisions were putted aside by 
the procedure of the claim to void them or of the complaint of extraodinary nature, 
and yet the defendants sentenced by these judges, after the end of the term of their 
punishment, were entrusted to the Gestapo to be shooted or to be sent o the concentra-
tion-camp. The judges themselves were criticized, threatened and often fired. 
   Besides of all odious decisions made by the administration of justice in the Nazi 
period, the heroic, but modest figure of this another type of judges should be never 
forgotten."20) 
   At last, turning to the starting point of positivism of law as it is, let us again pay 
attention to analytical positivism in England. It insists on the separation of law as 
it is and law as it ought o be. Therefore it is similar to logical, formalistic positivism 
of law in Continent, particulary in Germany. As we saw, the German legal positivism 
acquired a sinister character in the Nazi period. But the English one did not so, but 
it "went along with the most enlightened liberal attitudes". Then, why does the 
English way differ from the German way? As to this question, Prof. H.L.A. Hart
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sets forth an interesting idea by distinguishing carefully between two problems:valid 
law and fidelity to law. According to him, if laws or rules are enacted in accordance 
with the procedure of enactment, hey may well be said law or rule. But this does 
not mean that such rules or laws ought to be obeyed, as problem of fidelity to law is 
a moral question. If so, it is indeed necessary for him to offer "the moral criticism of 
institutions" from the English Utilitarian point of view not from a disputable 
philosophy even though laws may be law. Prof. Hart seems to think that such a 
utilitarian attitude make sound the English way in opposition to the German sinister 
way.21) 
   This idea is very suggestive to think of two different ways of positivism of law as 
it is. For English analytical positivism prompts us again to investigate its proper 
scope, as far as it finds itself on the borderline between value fields and law field by 
reference to the moral criticism of institutions. 
         Prof. E.V. Rostow, however, criticizes Prof. Hart for his self-contradiction 
     that he failed to develop his idea of moral investigation i his another paper.22) 
        In U.S.A. we can naturally find great figures like Gray, Justice Holmes in 
     regard to such an idea. Gray is plainly positivistic, as he tried to exclude non-
     positive law that is, natural aw from the framework of the law. But, after he 
     carefully distinguished the law from the sources of law from which the law
     arise, he gave the sources of law a role to aid the law and jurisprudence to dyna-
     mically develop. It "is the failing of many advocates of codification to regard 
     the Law too much as a fixed product of statutes, precedents, and customs, and 
     not to take into sufficient account he growth and change of the Law. This 
     growth and change is not a more weaving of spider webs out of the bowels of 
     the present rules of Law; a source of the Law, not the only source, but a source 
     and a main source, is found in the principles of ethics.' 123) Oliver W. Holmes 
     has been often thought as a founder of legal positivism in U.S.A. I think the 
     positivism of Holmes is true, as far as he emphasized to distinguish law and 
     morals. In the famous lecture "The Path of The Law", he pointed out as fol-
     lows. "For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every 
     word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other 
     words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside 
     the law. We should lose the fossil records of a good deal of history and the 
     majesty got from ethical associations, but by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary 
     confusion we should gain very much in the clearness of our thought."24) It
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      is however, necessary toconsider why he insisted on the distinction. He insisted 
     on it merely for the students who were interested in learning and studying the 
      law on the one hand. On the other hand, he was surely very careful to the
     interference of authority of old fashioned morals to the framework of law. But 
      these reasons do not prevent us to view Holmes as a sensible person to morals. 
      Rather, I think, he told us that morality is one of relevant sources of lawfrom 
     which the law develops, as Gray did it. Prof. Hart's idea of moral investigation 
     of fidelity to law remind us of such forerunners. 
    Recently, there has been an interesting discussion at the Belaggio Conference 
which shows the similar trend of legal thinking as to the moral investigation. It is 
worth noticing that some of participants (Prof. Alf Ross, G. Gavazzi, U. Scarpelli) 
suggested todeal with fidelity to law as moral responsibility of individuals or psycholo-
gical facts by separating it from legal.duty.25) Implications of positivism of law as 
it is are so various. After recognizing that such a position is much more closed to the 
borderline between value field and law field, than we imagined, we shall now turn to 
the last source. This is a problem of belief underlying legal positivism. 
                   The Fourth Source - Its Belief 
   As to its belief, we may well tentatively divide it into two types. One is belief 
in certainty, the other in probability. The first type is to believe in the law to be 
secure, steady and certain. Therefore it is only right to say that wherever modern 
positive law has been developed, we can easily find subjectively a belief in certainty 
of the law as well as objectively a nature of certainty as immanent in the law itself. 
In this connection, a good illustration is afforded by the conceptual jurisprudence of 
legal positivism in the latter half of 19th century Germany. For its fundamental dogma 
that the law is a self-consistent system without contradictions and gaps is actually 
followed by belief in the law to be certain and steady. That is why this belief, presup-
posing positive law as it is, tends to get a contact with normativism and logical positi-
vism of law. 
   Considering historically, however, to say law is certain presupposes, moreover, 
certain conditiones established that function of the law is not to be decided by an arbit-
rary will (of an adsolute monarch), but it is to be predictable, calculable like machine, 
hence, rational. It is Max Weber who pointed out such conditions as relevant to under-
stand fate of the modern law and society.26) In reality in Germany, the predictable or
                                                         15 
rational aw had been to some extent realized by setting positive law in order, mainly 
by means of codification beginning from the latter half of 19th century - Remember 
German Civil Code (BGB)!- If so, it seems to be obvious that such conditions offered 
a historical basis for belief in certainty of the law to develop in connection with the 
dogma viewing as a self-consistent system positive law. 
        Late Prof. F. Neumann outlined the relation between the predictability of
     the law and the capitalistic society characterized by free competition as follows. 
     "The rule of law is
, moreover, necessary as a pre-condition of capitalist competit-
     ion. The need for calculability and dependability in the legal system andin admi-
     nistration was one of the motives for restricting the power of the patrimonial 
     princes and of feudalism, leading ultimately to the establishment of Parliament 
     with the help of which the bourgeoisie controlled the administration a d budget 
     while participating in the modification of the legal system. Free competition 
     requires the generality of law because it is the highest form of formalrationality. 
     - A high degree of certainty of the expectation that contracts will be executed is
     an indispensable part of the enterprise. However, this calculability and pre-
     dictability, if the competitors are approximately equal in strength, can be at-
     tained only by general laws. These general laws must be so definite in their 
     abstractness that as little as possible is left to the discretion of the judge. In 
     such a society the judge, therefore, is forbidden to have recourse to General-
      klauseln."27) 
   The similar belief will be found also in the common law system. The central 
part of the English law, as we know, still at present is the case law, in other words, a 
system of judicial precedents, although it has certainly a system of statutory law. 
What developes the case law is the principle of precedents (the precedent doctrine). If 
this principle is "the principlee of treating like cases alike", it is natural for us to have an 
image of certainty of judicial decisions (precedents). Indeed, late Prof. W. Geldart 
wrote like this. "Certainty.-The fact that decided cases are binding authorities for the 
future makes it certain or at least highly probable that every future case which is es-
sentially similar will be decided in the same way. People may therefore regulate their 
conduct with confidence upon the law once laid down by the judges."28) Thus it be-
come obvious that belief in the certainty is also underlying normativism of common 
law as well as common law itself. 
         In this connection,English common law looks like closed to Continental 
     civil law. But how to consider the relation between them is still under disc-
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     ussion. For instance there is a discussion about the way of law-making. Mr. 
     N. S. Marsh, after thinking M. Weber as a scholar who devloped his theoryof 
     law making in the contrast between arational way of making law in Continent 
     and its irrational way in England, found somewhat exaggeration i Weber's 
     theory and proved the contrary - I don't go further here to examinewhether 
     this criticism is right - "There are, for example, in the law of delictssections 
     of the Code Civil, and, to a lesser extent, of the German Civil Code, whichleave 
     important questions to be decided irrationally in Weber's sense by the courts. 
     There are, on the other hand, even in the English law of torts, cases whichcould 
     be appropriately decided as mere questions of fact by reference to admittedprin-
      ciples. "39) 
   Belief underlying legal positivism, however, obviously not the only belief in the law 
to be ceratain and steady. Rather, the law is, as a matter of fact, changeable, and some-
times, even flexible and uncertain. Here rises the second type of belief in the law to 
be probable. Who emphasized this fact in a drastic expression was late Judge J. Frank. 
He called the first type of belief that the law is certain the "basic legal myth," by finding 
its reason ot only in the practicing lawyers, but in the layman's childish desire to substi-
tute the Law for "the Father as Infallible-Judge" It is as a natural result hat he criticized 
such a myth and he considered the law to be uncertain, indefinite and variable, especial-
ly in the judicial process. What is interesting in this connexion is that he proposed 
two formulas to clarify the very nature of judicial judgement. According to the con-
ventional theory how courts operate, judicial judgement is schematized by the formula 
Rule xFacts=Decision. In reality, there are several factors preventing to realize such 
a formula in the judicial process. One of the main factors will be schematized byanother 
formula Stimuli x Personality =Decision. This is only the simple illustration. But, 
only if we compare the former formula to the first type belief in certainty, the latter to 
the second type of belief in uncertainty, it becomes evident how Frank is deeply con-
cerned with uncetainty of the law and its belief.30) 
   Now one may wonder if Frank was not a legal positivist, but he was diametrically 
opposed to legal positivism, at least in his intention. In a sense, it is right. Intentional-
ly, he plainly denied mechanical jurisprudence, his approach is certainly opposed to 
normativism, logical or analytical positivism of law. As we have seen above in the 
section empiricism, however, sociological or psychological positivism of law is a part 
of legal positivism in a wider sense. Frank's realism seems to belongs to the positivism 
of this sort. If so, it is no wonder that we think of belief in probability as underlying
                                                       17 
legal positvism. Besides, the fact that such a belief in probability is opposed to nor-
mativism of legal positivism and its belief in certainty is not surprising, even if it looks 
funny at first glance. 
   Mr. Justice Holmes, too, is suggestive in regarding this problem. To use Frank's 
word, he is a "completely adult jurist"."') But he is a very cautious jurist, as well, 
in judging role of logic in the law. "The training of lawyers is a training in logic -
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method 
and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. 
But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the 
logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legi-
slative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the 
vey root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion alogical form. 
You always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is be-
cause of some belief as the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some 
opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not 
capable of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact 
logical conclusions. 1132) 
   As we know, Holmes' idea is so much open to interpretation that we can easily 
find many Holmes with different faces like positivist Holmes, pragmatist Holmes, rea-
list Holmes or totalitarian Holmes. But, the more various interpretation, the more 
his figuare is impressive. Because, while recognizing the significance oflogical or analyti-
cal positivism of law, he predicted with keen eyes future of sociological or psychological 
positivism, he appealed us strongly that the law is flexibly made in our daily experience -
"The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact
, and nothing more pretentious, are 
what I mean by the law"83)- therefore, the law is not certain, but probable in the 
judicial process. 
   Belief in probability of the law appears to be peculiar to the English legal system. 
Even Mr. Marsh who raised a question against Weber's theory of law making recognized 
certain limits of certainty, in other words, flexibility in the English law making.34) On 
the contrary, it is highly understandable that the civil law with its predictable or rational 
function in Continent has constituted an insuperable barrier to the desire of flexibility 
,of the law. That is why the Free Law movement which showed the belief in the law 
to be flexible and probable went often further to the extreme reaction.
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                         II. Reconsideration 
               Core and Penumbra of Legal Posvitisim 
    Sources of legal positivism are various as abovestated, and yet most of views of 
the law, 'except law as it ought to be like natural law, comes to be involved in this posi-
tivism. This way of approach to legal positivism may be right, if the fact is so. It 
is obvious, however, that legal positivism has been criticized in general by impression so 
that the core of it was getting clear merely by touching such a criticism, apart from 
whether the criticism is right. Then, what is core and penumbra ccording to the 
criticism by this impression? Here rises a core-penumbra problem of legal positivism. 
   What is under the word legal positivism meant is, surely, the viewpointof law which 
is only interested in positive law and deals with it in an empirical manner on the one 
side, rejects to deal with law in valid beyond positivie law, that is, law as it ought o be 
on the other side. In this context, we may say that the positive law position, especially 
normativism (but decisionsm in Anglo-American countries) and position placing a 
particular emphasis on law as it is as to the object of legal positivism, empiricism, es-
pecially logical, or analytical positivism of law as to its method, certainty as to its belief 
- all these constitute the core of legal positivism. 
   Around this core, the penumbra field is formed. There are mainly three sections 
of this field. At first, we can find the decisionism as an element in making positive 
law according to voluntarism, next, the sociological, psychological positivism of law 
which concerns with the law in the context of social relations or psychological situa-
tions where it functions as means of social control. At last, moral criticism of fidelity 
to law as to the problem whether man should obey a law. The concept of this criticism 
is worth to notice so far as it appeals people to morally reexamine on fidelity to a law 
while still standing on the position placing a particular emphasis on law as it is. These 
are a simple outline of the penumbra field. To confirm a meaning of the core-penum-
bra above outlined, we shall cite here the classification which Prof. H.L.A. Hart made 
in his polemical paper. He shows us five meanings of positivism bandied about in 
contemporary jurisprudence: 
   "( 1) thecontention that laws are commands of human beings, 
   (2) the contention that there is no necessary connection between law and morals 
or law as it is and ought to be, 
   (3 ) the contention thatthe analysis (or study of the meaning) of legal concepts
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is (a) worth pursuing and (b) to be distinguished from historical inquiries into the 
causes or origins of laws, from sociological inquiries into the relation of law and other 
social phenomena, and from the criticism or appraisal oflaw whether interms of morals, 
social aims, `functions,' or otherwise, 
    (4) the contentionthat a legal system is a `closed logical system' in which 
correct legal decisions can be deduced by logical means from predetermined l gal 
rules without reference tosocial aims, policies, moral standards, 
   (5) the contention that moral judgements cannot be established or defended, 
as statements of facts can, by rational, argument, evidence, orproof ('non-cognitivism' 
in ethics).") 
    Comparing these meanings with four sourcs of positivism stated above, we can 
find several links connecting between them: the contention (1) is equivalent to the deci-
sionism as a part of the positive law position, the contention (2) to the position placing 
a special emphasis on law as it is, the contention (3) (a) and (4) to the normativism as 
a part of the positive law position and the logical, analytical positivism of law as a part 
of empiricism. In other words, Austinian theory of law, that is, analytical positivism 
especially involves the contention (3) (a), while conceptual jurisprudence in 19th cen-
tury Germany t pically embodies the contention (4). Moreover, the contention (5), 
though corresponding, to some xtent, o the position placing a special emphasis on 
law as it is, is much more aiming at to clarify nature of moral judgements in contrast 
to statement of facts. We may say that statement of facts is descriptive, moral judge-
ment is prescriptive. Anyhow, as moral judgement is dealt with as hard to varify, 
this contention (5) is rather elated to ethical noncognitivism, as Hart remarked, and 
to relativism, as Prof. W. Friedmann pointed out.36) Therefore, it seems better to 
exclude the contention (5) in order to decide the proper scope of legal positivism. 
   Thus it is possible toconclude that he contentions established by Hart correspond 
mainly to the sources of legal positivism stated above. Because, as to the contention 
(1), though we at first stated it as belonging tothe penumbra field of legal positivism, 
it seems better to deal with it as being quasi to the core of that positivism, whenever 
recalling to our mind decisonistic view of Austinian positivism and Nazi legal ideology 
that law is nothing but decision of leader (Fi hrer). 
   Despite of this fact, there are no contentions equivalent tosome sources which we 
have pointed out. These are belief in certainty of law as a part of the core on the one 
hand, the sociological or psychological positivism of law and the- moral criticism of 
fidelity to law as parts of the penumbra field on the other hand. On looking at the
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latter, it is observed that there is an interesting contrast. As to the moral criticism, 
Prof. Hart seems naturally to take account it since he emphasized this criticism being 
a merit peculiar to the English analytical positivism, in contrast o the German legal 
positivism with its sinister fate. On the contrary, it actually is necessary to give atten-
tion the fact that he distinctly excluded the sociological nd psychological inquiries 
into law and other phenomena from the task of legal positivism in the contention (3) 
(b). 
   His idea on this last problem itself is not surprising and shocking, but right, in 
accordance to the dominant approach to the legal positivism up to now. Because 
this approach used to distinguish from the legal positivism in a narrow sense (logical 
and analytical positivism of law) the sociological nd paychological inquiries on the 
ground that these inquiries were originated from the founders who were not always 
interested in legal problems (like: A. Comte) and yet, even so, investigated legal 
problems from the aspect of sociology or psychology. However these inquiries in their 
origin were different from that positivism, but it is incontrovertible fact that these are 
treated as a type of positivism of law at present. Moreover, sociology of law, pragmatic 
jurisprudence and legal realism has their great merits, so far as they analyze social 
background of the law, social relations where it functions as means of social control 
so that they prevent he law isolating from social reality the isolation which is a 
famous defect of the legal positivism considered in its core. Taking all these facts 
into consideration, there is no positive reason, I believe, to prevent us to classify the 
sociological or psychological positivism of law as a constituent of legal positivism in 
a wider sense.37) 
   I have made a classification of the core-penumbra field of legal positivism in ac-
cordance with a popular impression for convenience of illustration. It does not mean, 
therefore, that the core would be more valuable than the penumbra nd yet relevant 
at present. Rather, to accurately judge legal positivism, we should beforehand clearify 
meanings of four sources of this positivism and think over under what situation each 
of these characteristic positivism is called for and consequently functions. 
       Judgement of Legal Positivism under Logic of Situation. 
   The core of legal posititivism has been often condemnedby popular criticism as 
if it brought evils on the world of the law. The case of German legal positivism during 
the Nazi period is one of the typical illustrations criticized in this manner. Here, in
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this period, the position placing a special empahsis on law as it is, combined with the 
normativism and logical or analytical positivism, reached the tragic conclusion, so far 
as it asserted to observe any laws whenever these were given by state power, regardless 
of their content which happened to be immoral and unhuman. Besides, when this 
legal positivism in connection with the decisionism accepted unconditionally decisions 
made by will of leader as laws and willingly adapted them, we can see nothing but the 
caricature ofhistory. Judging legal positivism from such a experience, situation emanat-
ed from the Nazi period, it seems natural, to some extent, to condemn it as the most 
odious view bringing evils on the world of law. 
   But, However there might be a naturalreason, we can not, I think, pass over it 
as it is. Let us investigate the contention that Nazi laws were so iniquitous in the 
sense contradicted to humanity or justice or natural aw that these were not law. 
Whenever man contends in this manner that Nazi laws are not to be called law, it would 
be inevitable that certain value judgement is introduced into the statement whether 
or not they are law--value judgement like expressed in the term of humanity, justice 
or natural aw. In other words, by introducing value judgement into the statement 
of what is law, such a contention would bring about worse results to confuse simple 
statement with value judgement. Here is a danger of persuasive definition according 
to Prof. C.L. Stevenson.S8) For the reason above, Prof. Alf Ross is afraid of a danger 
of this sort by reference to late Prof. Radbruch's view of ubergesetzliches Recht 
(law beyond positive laws).39) 
   This notion of Prof. Ross seems to be relevant. In dealing with such a problem, 
there should be careful consideration to present a plain statement of law as it is, that 
is, to make the statement objective (intersubjective) by restraining subjective value 
judgement, and after that, it may be reasonable to present a value judgement whether 
or not the statement isjustified, as Prof. Hart did it. The logical or analytical positi-
vism of law, so far as making such a consideration, aims at, at least, to present he 
objective statement. In this respect, it is still suggestive and we may well say that 
it offers us minimum guaranty to operate objectively (though in a relative sense) in 
defining and developing legal concept and legal dogmatics. 
         Moreover, it is natural necessity, too,to investigate logic of law itself. 
     For instance, it is worth noticing the remarks of E. Ehrlich on this problem: 
     "deduction of judicial decision from legal rules plays in reality a verylimited 
     role. Besides of this, generalization, analogy, induction, treatment of indefinite 
     conceptions, of principles of general egislative policy and legal techniques,
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     construction which is made by procedure of abstraction founded on systematic 
     and dialectic methods, all of these can be done always only under the condition 
     when judges proper interest is taken into consideration, even thoughit would 
     not reach the most unpleasant consequence. Here, task of judge is the same 
     as that of legislator, accordingly, it presupposes the same discretion of judge 
     as much as legislator supposed to have it."40) To use carefully logic of law, 
     it seems at least necessary to refer to the contribution of logical positivism-in 
     the field of law at present. 
   Significance of logic and analytical method in law or judicial process, however, 
is naturally to be admitted within certain limitations. The view of Mr. Justice Holmes 
under which he recognized limitations of logic as well as its sound scope, should be 
refered here, too, in order to estimate proper significance of the logical and analytical 
positivism of law. 
   Then, how about role or function of legal positivism of this sort? It has been 
severely condemned in its role or function as we have seen above. But is it very reasona-
ble if we would apriori judge the legal positivism of this sort to be wrong on the mere 
ground of such a situation or experience happened in Nazi Germany? Here is a funda-
mental issue. In fact, even under the Nazi regime when at the height of its power, 
there was actually an effort o maintain the independence of judges by taking an intellig-
ent stand of the normativism against heir regime. However the effort looked poor or 
vain against such a tyranny, the normativistic positivism of law, at least in the light of 
this effort, is, I think, to be rightfully appreciated in its plus (progressive) role. That 
in Italy, too, the legal positivism of this sort played and plays a role to defend the law 
against the interference of the Facism, later the pressure of Catholic Church - someit-
mes in the name of natural law - has been reported at the Belaggio Conference.41) 
   Therefore, if we would come to the conclusion that the legal positivism of this sort 
in general plays a minus (negative) role precisely because it did so merely under a few 
situations or experiences, the wisdom of this course must be doubted. Rather, it is 
desirable here to judge legal positivism in accordance with the situation where it is called 
for and the role which it plays under the situation. 
   Such is also the case with the penumbra field of the legal positivism. Let us con-
sider the view of moral criticism of fidelity to law. This view, though it pesupposes 
the position of law as it is, that is, the position to deal with the law as vlid law so far as 
it is enacted in accordance with the procedure of statutory enactment, emphasizes to
adopt careful attitude toward the problem whether or not we should morally obey that
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law. We can sympathize with such a view so far as it plays in reality a critical role 
against the cynicism of the Nazi or Facistic theory of law while maintaining the position 
of law as it is. On the other hand, we can not deny that it leaves a hidden canal to 
justify political interference or religious pressure to the law in the name of moral criti-
cism. That is why most Italian scholars attended at that Conference are negative to 
this view inspite of the fact they are very much concerned about the relevance of the 
moral criticism. 
   The same is the case with the sociological positivism of law as a part of the penumbra 
field. For instance, sociology of law at present, as mentioned above, seems to be really 
important for progress of the law and jurisprudence, since it offers the keen perspective 
to prevent he law isolating from social reaity by dealing with the law in the social con-
text where it functions. But as a matter of fact we can not deny the fact that there is 
a chance to loosen a framework of the law to be strict by giving a free, sometimes sub-
jective discretion to judge in the name of sociological pproach - Remember the Free 
Law movement in Germany - Here, too, it raises in a case question of political inter-
fernce or social pressure such and such. 
   Above all, it is now obvious that the role of legal positivism in its penumbra field 
should be judged in the light of the situation where it is called for as well as it functions. 
   What is the situation is a next problem to examine. Let us cite againthe phrase 
used by Mr. Justice Holmes in his deision. "But the character of every act depends 
upon the circumstances in which it is done. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 205, 
206. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theater, and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from 
an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect force. Gompers v. 
Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439. The question in. every case is whether 
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress 
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."42) If we substitute 
the word situation for the circumstance used above, an outline of the stiuation seems 
to be getting clearer. The word situation itself, however, is vague and permits everal 
implications. Whether we are living under the democratic regime or the tyranny 
like Nazi and Fascist regime, costitutes also one of the distinct features of the situation. 
The other feature would be found in socio-economic background of the law as suggested 
by K. Marx or M. Weber. We may understand them as-offering a wider scope of the 
situation. But the socio-cultural tradition of each nations and several types of ways
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of thinking conditioned by it, constituting a cetral feature of the situation, seems to 
afford the key to a judgement of legal positivism in connenction with its role. For 
instance, the reviewer of the Belaggio Conference shows us some contrast of ways of 
thinking immanate between Anglo-American and Italian participants inthat Conference: 
"the Anglo-American approach to legal philosophy stresses analysis as an intellectual 
enterprise quite independent of the history of philosophical thought...The Anglo-
American conferees prefered to organize discussion on a point-to-point basis, narrowing 
discussion to the consideration of a very specific question. The Italians seemed to 
prefer a position-by-position approach in which a more extended presentation by a 
speaker raises a series of specific questions which are then responded to in a statement 
of counter-position - We feel that the position-by-position way of doing philosophy 
exhibits a broader philosophic tendency to rely upon highly abstract concepts in the 
course of reasoning and analysis. Such a tendency is crystallized on the Continent 
in Begriffsjusrisprudenz, a jurisprudential approach explicitly rejected by the Italian 
participants, but nevertheless implicitly active in their thought, exhibited by the search 
and acceptance of unanalyzed broad organizing categories. 1143) Viewed in this light, 
certainly here is a contrast hat the former prefers to analyze individual legal terms and 
concepts, the latter prefers to pursue the historical study of the law in its causes and 
effects and yet to deal with the law in the manner of the conceptual jurisprudence, 
notwithstanding that both of them are on the same ground of the legal positivism. 
   In addition, Prof. H. J. Berman has clarified a characteristic ofAmerican way of 
thinking on the matter of legal philosophy. Legal philosophy or philosophy of law is 
at least familiar for Continental scholars or the scholars who learned in the civil law system. 
According to Prof. Berman, however, "many Americans, on the other hand, distrust 
legal philosophy altogether. It is often said that American law, like English law, is 
highly empirical in its method, that it proceeds from case to case and from problem to 
problem, seeking practical solutions without reference to a systematic set of doctrines 
or a comprehensive theory."44) 
   Moreover, the political situation invites consideration. Taking the political situa-
tion into consideration, it may well be said, though in a paradoxical way, that what 
in U.S.A. is viewed progressive, is viewed, as reactional in Italy. This is illu-
starated by reference to the American Realism. According to the Reviewer of the 
Belaggio Conference, "what is regarded a liberal theory in the United States might 
operate in a reactionary fashion in Italy"46) where the urgent ask is to give the judiciary 
an effective shield against he political and ecclesiastical pressures.
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   But it is deserve attention that there is a contrast not only between the different 
areas like Anglo-American and Continental, but even within the Anglo-American circle. 
The contrast rising from the English and American way of thinking on the matter of 
law has been recently pointed out by Prof. E. V. Rostow in regard to the Wolfendon 
Report: "In Great Britain, the suggestion that law has a moral content seems to raise 
theocratic gohsts in many quarters, perhaps in most; and clearly, thocracy is `Conser-
vative.' In the United States, however, it is just the other way around. Every Ameri-
can schoolboy - or at least every American law student - considers Austinian positi-
vism, and the strict separation of law and morals, to be certain hallmarks of a position 
labelled `Conservative,' `Rigidly Techical,' ` Reactionary,' or worse. And the view 
of law as an instrument for carrying out the moral purposes of its own tradition, and 
those of the society it rules, is a familiar touchstone of orthodox `Liberalism.' "46) 
         "The Wolfendon Report" refered above is the "Report of the Committee 
     on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution" set up by the Home Officeunder Sir 
     J. Wolfenden as Chairman which was presented to the House of Commons, 1957. 
     In dealing with the problem of homosexual offences and prostitution, the Report 
     asserts to separate crime from sin, positive law from moral aw and privatemorali-
     ty (private immorality too) from interference ofthe law. Such an assertion raised 
     naturally severe controversy about morality and function of criminal aw. It 
     is no wonder in England where the traditional idea of separation of law as it is
     and law as it ought o be, is still dominant, hat the assertion isviewed as liberal,
     while the opposite assertion to restraint private immorality by means of statutory 
     enactment to enforce public morality, that is, Devlinism is47) thoughtasconser-
      vative. On this issue, however, Prof. Rostow, as we have shown above,made 
     critical remarks on the following ground: "In the popular sport of classifying 
     all positions on all subjects as either Liberal or Conservative - thereis an in-
     triguing difference between the rules of the game as it is conventionally played 
     on the opposite sides of the Atlantic." 
   For the reason above, we should strictly avoid to condemn or appreciate l gal posi-
tivism in general simply because of judgement of certain type of the legal positivism 
under the special stituation of experience. As far as we see as relativ at each times our 
knowledge and we think that our judgement depends on the condition under which it 
is desired to make, the logic of situation, cultural tradition of each nation, ways of 
thinking of lawyers and legal scholars, several political situations included, is decisively 
relevant in order to judge legal positivism. This does not mean, however, that we
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avoid to be confronted with and to judge legal positivism itself merely by groping the 
logic of situation. It would be nothing but a relativism to withhold value judgement 
in the Pilate's manner. This defeats my own purpose. Besides the logic of situation, 
we need a minimum of frame of reference to examine and criticize it if necessary, in
order. to get out of a trap of sceptical relativism hidden in the logic of situation. By 
outlining this frame of reference and the problem of basic value, I would like to finish 
off my paper. 
        Logic of Situation, Frame of Reference and Basic Value 
   If the logic of situation, figuratively speaking, shows us a dimension located at 
the lower side of the vertical line which legal positivism ought to take into consideration, 
it is frame of reference, basic value, which, as a dimension located at the upper side, 
brings such a consideration under control to give the right orientation. What is, at 
first, worth noticing is that frame of reference is to be sought as rooted in the action 
radious and way of action of citizen according to the given situation. Therefore, frame 
of reference in an ordinary sense is standard of action under which they have acted within 
a community in for years. We may find many examples, either consistent with society 
like rules of formal etiquette and of social clubs, or inconsistent with society like rules 
of Mafia or Mura-hachibu (in Japan). In this context, standards of citizen's action 
are various and pluralistic. Since modernization of society and state have had an im-
portant effect o awake people to a sense of their own common interest and common 
way of action, however, it is a matter of universal knowledge to citizen that various 
standards of action have been levelled to some common reasonable standards which 
offer a real basis of frame of reference. It may be called rules of way of autonomous 
action and association ofcitizen. The principles which late Prof. F. Neumann mention-
ed afford a good example of frame of reference in the field of law. 
   I. "The legal equality of all men ... II. All laws affecting life and liberty must be 
general in character ... III. Retroactive laws, that is, ex post facto legislation depriving 
man of life and liberty, violate the principle of the law's universality ... IV. The enforce-
ment of laws affecting life and liberty must be entrusted to an organ separated from 
the decison making agencies of the state." 
         "These four statementsseem
," in his view, "to embody the minimum 
     political content derived from the proposition of man's rational character." 
     "These minima.. .are thus valid, regadless of the political system, valid against
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          any political system, even against a democracy."4s) 
        These principles, even at a glance, will show us how they are ordinary and natural. 
    Such principles, however being ordinary and natural, are not nonsense and valueless 
    as basic values, but they show us themselves somuch for valuable, since they arebrought 
    up in daily lives of our civil society. They may remind us, on the other hand, the fact 
    that they have been developed under the suggestions, mainly given by modern natural 
    law theories. This course of development is definitely recognized by Neumann him-
    self. But we don't need to be anxious about the course, too. For "what modern 
    natural aw scholars called natural law (Naturrecht) corresponds principallywith the 
    law living in the social structures, opposite to the law enacted by the state,"49) hence, 
    these principles are nothing but an ideological expression of desires immanentin the 
    civil society in the name of natural aw. 
       At last we shall refer to basic values like dignity of human being or human being 
    of dignified bearing. Basic values here are, so to speak, enriched of their contents by 
    logic of situation and frame of reference as well as they do give them certain limits or 
    direction as polestar. If so, they have no connection with values having apriori validity. 
    The conclusion we temporarily arrived at is that we may accept he legal positivism 
    with its contentions under certain conditions: that is, to modify its core in the way 
    stated above and to reserve the penumbra fields for it as substantial means to keep 
    in touch with peripheries of the law, by reference to basic values, frame of reference 
    and logic of situation. This is, I think, one of the possible way to answer questions 
    about legal positivism, paricularly raised by Prof. E. Schmidt. 
             If my attempt o understand legal positivism in such a wider scope might 
          be still open to needless discussion, I am ready to substitute critical empiricism 
         of the law for the word legal positivism. What does the word criticalmeans 
          here is a position to examine use of empirical approach and its limits,hence 
         to pay close attention to value problem, notwithstanding that basically accepting 
         empiricism itself. But this position naturally does not permit even the factthat 
         value in the name of natural aw has apriori validity. Even though we would 
          suppose so, there remains an unavoidable trouble that in a case of concrete 
          decision, value in the same name of natural law would be defendedfor its 
         priority against he value in the name of natural aw so that both of these two
         values would be brought into an ideological conflict which knows no end.
         Actually this is not an imaginary case, but a real trouble post-war Germanyhas
          faced with60) to solve. For, here in this country, the acute task to punish
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     people who, to drive out their personal enemies, or to get rid of unwanted 
     spouses, informed the Nazi regime against heir victims for their spiteful or 
     provocative remarks about the Nazi leaders, raised a necessity of ex post facto 
     legislation in the name of justice or natural law. This assertion, however, 
     caused necessarily a opposite assertion that the ex post facto legislation, as we 
     know, is against the principle, that is, nulla poena sine lege. On viewing broadly 
      such a discussion, we observe that the problem whether or not ex post facto 
     legislation should be enacted broke natural law party up into diametrically 
     opposite camps. This is why I have made an effort to avoid to becaught in 
     a trap of needless discussion by setting a chain of logic of situation and frame 
     of referene before getting into the problem of basic value. 
         Moreover, here is a difference of the frame of reference from the natural 
     law theory that frame of reference, as far as it is viewed within a framework 
     of experience, is conditioned by expeience-situation as well gives it under 
      control to afford the right orientation. For instance, the ex post facto 
     legislation stated above, or the Control Council Law No. 10 as its criminal 
     enactment may naturally be considered to be against the third principle 
     postualted by Neumann and it comes to have to be rejected from our frame 
     of reference. But, in reality, it is the evident fact that this course of criminal 
     legislation was retroactively realized under the special circumstancefor the 
     cleanup operation at that time by sacrifycing that principle. If so, it still 
     raises a question how far the frame of reference can be and should be 
     accepted in reality. But I shall refer it in another paper. 
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